Volume 111

Issue 3

Article 10

April 2009

Prison Conditions and Inmate Competency to Waive
Constitutional Rights
Shireen A. Barday

Follow this and additional works at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr
Part of the Law Enforcement and Corrections Commons

Recommended Citation
Shireen A. Barday, Prison Conditions and Inmate Competency to Waive Constitutional Rights, 111 W. Va.
L. Rev. (2009).
Available at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol111/iss3/10

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the WVU College of Law at The Research Repository @
WVU. It has been accepted for inclusion in West Virginia Law Review by an authorized editor of The Research
Repository @ WVU. For more information, please contact ian.harmon@mail.wvu.edu.

Barday: Prison Conditions and Inmate Competency to Waive Constitutional R

PRISON CONDITIONS AND INMATE COMPETENCY
TO WAIVE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
ShireenA. Barday*
I.
H.

INTRODUCTION ..............................................
831
A BRIEF HISTORY OF SOLITARY CONFINEMENT AND
SUPERM AX PRISONS ...........................................
832

III.

PSYCHOLOGICAL STRESS AND INMATE ISOLATION ...........................
835
THE COURTS AND SOLITARY CONFINEMENT ................................
840

IV.
V.

THE CASE FOR RE-EVALUATING INMATES ............................
842

VI.

A MODEL FOR COURTS: WHEN TO ORDER

VII.

COMPETENCY DETERMINATIONS ..................................
844
C ONCLUSION ...............................................
846

I. INTRODUCTION

There are hundreds of thousands of mentally ill men and women in
United States jails and prisons, and the proportion of incarcerated individuals
with serious mental illnesses is growing.' The Bureau of Justice estimates that
more than half of all inmates suffer from some sort of psychological condition,
and the number of mentally ill people in prison is three times larger than the
entire population of those in mental health hospitals. 2 Of those who were not
mentally ill when they entered prison, "15-20% will require some form of psychiatric intervention during their incarceration. 3 Almost all of these persons
will need psychiatric treatment as a result of their experiences in solitary confinement. 4 In Oregon, New York, California, and Washington, approximately
one-quarter of all inmates in solitary confinement suffer from mental illness; in
Iowa and Indiana, that proportion stands at one-half. 5 Despite these astounding

*
1

J.D., Stanford Law School, 2008.
SASHA ABRAMSKY & JAMIE FELLNER, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ILL EQUIPPED: U.S. PRISONS

AND OFFENDERS WITH MENTAL ILLNESS 17 (2003) AM. PsYCHIATRIc ASS'N, PSYCHIATRIC
SERVICES INJAILS AND PRISONS xix (2d ed. 2000).
2
See Study Finds More than Half of all Prison and Jail Inmates Have Mental Health Problems, http:llwww.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/press/mhppjipr.htm (last visited Mar. 20, 2009).
3
Jeffrey L. Metzner et al., Treatment in Jails and Prisons,in TREATMENT OF OFFENDERS WITH

MENTAL DISORDERS 211, 211 (Robert M. Wittstein ed., 1998).
4
5

Id.
ABRAMSKY & FELLNER, supra note 1, at 147-49.
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statistics, few courts have ever questioned the competency of these individuals
when they seek to waive constitutional rights after being placed in solitary confinement.
This essay argues that courts must revisit the question of competency
whenever an inmate who has been subjected to solitary confinement seeks to
waive constitutional rights. Although subjecting a person to solitary confinement may not violate the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual
punishment, it may nevertheless impair an inmate's exercise of constitutional
rights by undermining his mental health and thus his capacity to appreciate the
waiver of his core rights. To the extent that it does, allowing inmates to proceed
without re-evaluating their competency at new junctures threatens the integrity
of the judicial system and undermines the reliability of the adversarial process.
II.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF SOLITARY CONFINEMENT AND SUPERMAX PRISONS

No formal definition of solitary confinement exists, however, it is typically described as the confinement of an inmate to a cell for all, or nearly all, of
the day, with minimal or no environmental stimulation or opportunity for social
interaction. 6 Chase Riveland, a former Secretary of Corrections in Washington
State and Colorado, has described the modem adaptation of solitary confinement as follows:
a highly restrictive, high-custody housing unit within a secure
facility, or an entire facility, that isolates inmates from the general prison population and from the general prison population
and from each other due to grievous crimes, repetitive assaultive or violent institutional basis, the threat of escape or actual
escape from high-custody facility(s), or inciting or threatening
to incite disturbances in a correctional institution. 7
Riveland terms this form of modem-day solitary confinement as "supermax. ' 8 Indeed, inmates in such facilities are often secluded in their cells
anywhere from twenty-two to twenty-three and a half hours per day.9 The remaining hours are reserved for either showering or recreation without permitting
the inmate to interact with others.' ° The intense isolation imposed upon inmates
by solitary confinement also prohibits them from conversing with other inmates
6
See Stuart Grassian, Psychopathological Effects of Solitary Confinement, 140 Am. J.
PSYCHIATRY 1450 (1983) [hereinafter Grassian, PsychopathologicalEffects].
7
Id. at 5.
8

Id.

9

JAMIE FELLNER & JOANNE MARINER, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, COLD STORAGE: SUPER-

MAXIMUM SECURrrY CONFINEMENT ININDIANA I (1997).
10
See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 494 (1995) (outlining the daily conditions inmates face

in solitary confinement).
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or prison officials: the confined inmates are categorically forbidden from verbally interacting with inmates during any movement through the prison; prison
officials give them instructions through loud speakers; and prison officials almost always open and close cell doors electronically. 1 The closest inmates
come to human interaction occurs during mealtime, when, as one court has described, guards open a trap door "into the dead space of a vestibule through
which12 [the] guard may transfer items to the inmate without interacting with
him."
When inmates in solitary confinement are permitted to engage in recrea-13
tion, it often takes place within a completely enclosed space within the prison.
In order to leave his cell, either for recreation or anything else, the inmate must
undergo a "visual strip search" in front of the control tower officer. This requirement
has radically reduced the number of inmates who leave their cells at
14
all.

Solitary confinement was revived in the United States during the twentieth century after decades of skepticism about its effectiveness.15 Although the
practice was initially employed as a general penological model, 16 its adverse
psychological impact on inmates led prisons within the United States and other
countries to abandon the practice.17 While solitary confinement was rejected as
a general tool for maintaining prison order on the basis of its negative impact on
inmates, solitary confinement was nonetheless deemed necessary and appropri11 See Bryan B. Walton, The Eighth Amendment and Psychological Implications of Solitary
Confinement, 21 LAw & PSYCHOL. REV. 271, 284 (1997).
12
Jones 'El v. Berge, 164 F. Supp. 2d 1096, 1098 (W.D. Wis. 2001).
13 Scott N. Tachiki, Indeterminate Sentences in Supermax Prisons Based upon Alleged Gang
Affiliation: A Reexamination of Procedural Protection and a Proposalfor Greater Procedural
Requirements, 83 CAL. L. REV. 1115, 1124 (1995).
14 See Nan D. Miller, InternationalProtection of the Rights of Prisoners:Is Solitary Confinement in the United States a Violation of InternationalStandards?,26 CAL. W. INT'L. L.J. 139, 159
(1995) (noting that many inmates go for "months or potentially years without any normal social
contact").
1s Peter Scharff Smith, The Effects of Solitary Confinement on PrisonInmates: A Brief History
and Review of the Literature,34 CRIME & JUST.441, 441 (2006).
16
See DAVID J. ROTHMAN, THE DISCOVERY OF THE ASYLUM; SOCIAL ORDER AND DISORDER IN
THE NEw REPUBLIC 81 (1971) (outlining the history of the penitentiary system); see also MICHEL
FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON (1995) (tracing the theories underlying the modem penal system); MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, A JUST MEASURE OF PAIN: PENITENTIARY IN

THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION 1780-1850 (1978) (same).
17 See, e.g., Grassian, PsychopathologicalEffects, supra note 6, at 1450-51 (describing German studies that outlined the pervasive and widespread psychological problems among prison
populations subjected to solitary confinement, including rampant delusions and incidents of amnesia). Many attribute the initial demise of solitary confinement as a general penological model to
several high-profile incidents involving inmates who were subjected to long-term solitary confinement, including the death of five inmates at Auburn Prison in New York during the nineteenth
century following a year of solitary confinement. See, e.g., Karen Blair, A 196 Year Push to Make
Prisons Work, SCHOLASTIC UPDATE, Feb. 9, 1987, at 18.
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ate in "extreme" cases. Such cases occurred when prison officials found it necessary to confine inmates who were deemed 18to be at high risk of escaping,
harming themselves, or disrupting prison order.
This modem disciplinary form of solitary confinement took the shape of
so-called "Segregated Housing Units" (SHU) or "Supermax Prisons," both of
which are now numerous and predominantly state-run. In fact, there is only one
federal supermax facility in the United States-ADX Florence in Florence, Colorado. Many states have also created standalone facilities within lower security
prisons that meet "supermax standards."' 9 To date, approximately 30 states
maintain some type of facility that can be described as "supermax. 2 °
While all inmates are isolated and deprived to a certain extent, the usage
of solitary confinement as a disciplinary measure is distinguishable from general
imprisonment on three grounds. First, whereas most prison environments provide inmates with abundant opportunities for social interaction, the solitary confinement experience is specifically designed to severely limit human contact. 21
The physical conditions of solitary confinement amplify the sense of isolation
generally felt by prisoners, because unlike regular prison cells, solitary confinement cells tend to lack windows and barred doors. 22 Second, solitary confinement is used as a punitive measure above and beyond general incarceration;
inmates are specifically selected to undergo the deprivation innate to solitary
confinement, a practice that imposes a distinct psychological hardship on inmates placed in solitary confinement. 23 Third, assignment to solitary confinement is unrelated to an inmate's original offense. Rather, it is a punitive measure "reserved for prisoners who commit serious disciplinary violations once in
prison or who are deemed to endanger the safety of others or the security of the
prison system.' 24

18

Andrew J. Theis, Note, The Gang'sAll Here: How the Supreme Court's Unanimous Hold-

ing in Wilkinson v. Austin Utilizes Supermax Facilitiesto Combat Prison Gangs and Other Security Threats, 29 HAMLINE L. REv. 145, 157 (2006). The concept behind supermax prisons dates
back to the 1983 permanent lockdown of the United States Penitentiary in Marion, Illinois, following the murder of two corrections officers at that prison during separate incidents during the
same day. Id. On the heels of this tragedy, several maximum security prisons transitioned to "full
lockdown" or "administrative segregation," and many new prisons were built pursuant to this
standard. CHASE R1VELAND, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SUPERMAX PRISONS: OVERVIEW AND GENERAL

CONSIDERATIONS 1 (1999), availableat http://nicic.org/pubs/1999/014937.pdf.
19
Theis, supra note 18, at 157 n.86 (noting that not all prisons derive from the same model,
and accordingly some go by "various names including special housing unit, maxi-maxi, [and]
maximum control facility").
20
RIVELAND, supra note 18, at 1.
21
See Leena Kurki & Norval Morris, The Purposes, Practices, and Problems of Supermax
Prisons,28 CRIME & JUST. 385, 385-88 (2001); Miller, supra note 14, at 158.
22
See Miller, supra note 14, at 158.
23
See Kurki & Morris, supra note 21, at 389.
24
Tachiki, supra note 13, at 1118.
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There is limited information regarding how long inmates typically
spend in solitary confinement.25 Sentences generally range from several days to
several years, but in one extreme case, two prisoners at the Louisiana State Penitentiary at Angola have been in non-air conditioned isolation cells for 23 hours
per day since 1972.26
III. PSYCHOLOGICAL STRESS AND INMATE ISOLATION

It is almost uncontested that conditions in supermax prisons generate
deleterious effects among inmates. Only two post-World War II studies of the
effects of solitary confinement on inmates' mental health report only a minor
psychological impact.27 One of these was a longitudinal control group study of
sixty inmates of whom slightly less than half remained in administrative segregation for sixty days. As those authors acknowledge, their findings that administrative segregation had little or no impact on inmates was "somewhat irrelevant to current segregation practices in the United States where offenders can be
segregated for years for disciplinary infractions," because inmates in their study
were tested on average 3.6 days into their isolation, even if they remained in
solitary confinement for a longer period of time.28 The other study reported that
solitary confinement can inflict inmates with numerous adverse health effects,
including insomnia, dizziness, distortion of a sense of time, anger, apathy, and
impaired memory, but rejected these effects as qualifying as significant impairments.29
Many researchers acknowledge that it can be difficult to pinpoint the
precise symptoms suffered by isolated inmates placed in solitary confinement
because inmates tend to hide their conditions. 30 Male inmates have been especially prone to this tendency. These inmates cite concerns that an inability to
cope with solitary confinement is perceived as a weakness by those around
25

See Jerry R. DeMaio, If You Build It, They Will Come: The Threat of Overclassificationin

Wisconsin's Supermax Prison, 2001 Wis. L. REV. 207, 245 (2001).
26
Claire Shaeffer-Duffy, Solitary Confinement: An American Invention, NAT'L CATH. REP.
(2000), available at http://www.natcath.con/NCR_Online/archives/112400/112400d.htm;
see
also Brooke Shelby Biggs, Life in Solitary Confinement: 12,775 Days Alone, ALTERNET, April 17,
2007, http://www.altemet.org/rights/50663/ (noting that two of the three men colloquially known
as the "Angola 3" who were suspected of murdering a prison guard in 1972 have been in administrative segregation since the incident; the third established his innocence and was released in 2001
after spending approximately thirty years in solitary confinement).
27

IVAN

ZINGER AND CHERAMI WICHMANN, THE PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF

60

DAYS IN

ADMINISTRATIVE SEGREGATION (1999); Peter Suedfeld et al., Introduction and Historical Background, in SENSORY DEPRIVATION: FwFrEEN YEARS OF RESEARCH (1982).
28
Id. at 64.
29

Suedfeld, supra note 27.

30
See HANS TOCH, MOSAIC OF DESPAIR: HUMAN BREAKDOWNS IN PRISON 65 (1992); Grassian,
PsychopathologicalEffects, supra note 6, at 1451; MICHAEL JACKSON, PRISONERS OF ISOLATION:
SOLITARY CONFINEMENT INCANADA 65 (1983).
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them. 3 1 Those who do reveal symptoms, even those as extreme as selfmutilation, are often interpreted by prison officials, including doctors32 and
guards, as trying to manipulate the system in order to get special treatment.
Other researchers confirm that it is often extraordinarily difficult and
traumatic for isolated individuals to talk about their experiences of solitary confinement both during and after.3 3 Some interpret the lack of complaints as a
sign of a healthy adaptation strategy, while others recognize it as symptomatic
of a form of social withdrawal that is typically accompanied by severe psychological problems. 34 Regardless, inmates in solitary confinement tend to be underserved in terms of medical and psychological care. All agree that "supermax
degrades the workers" who must observe inmates on a daily basis, to the extent
that prison officials become "numb" towards inmates' complaints or aberrant
behavior.35
This tendency is truly troubling when considered in light of the fact that
solitary confinement produces a higher rate of psychiatric and psychological
health problems than "normal" imprisonment. The Supreme Court first acknowledged the devastating effects of prolonged solitary confinement on prisoners not otherwise predisposed to mental illness during the nineteenth century:
A considerable number of prisoners fell, after even a short confinement, into a semi-fatuous condition, from which it was next
to impossible to arouse them, and others became violently insane; others still, committed suicide; while those who stood the
ordeal better were not generally reformed, and in most cases did
not recover sufficient mental
activity to be of any subsequent
36
community.
the
to
service
Fifty years later, the Court would refer to "solitary confinement" as one
form of "physical and mental torture" used by governments to, among other
things, coerce confessions.37 The psychiatric literature confirms the profound
and negative impact of prolonged isolation. As early as 1912, adverse effects of
conditions of imprisonment were documented to include "extremely vivid halluSee FELLNER & MARINER, supra note 9, at 63 n.120;
SOLITARY CONFINEMENT IN DANISH PRISONS (1988).

31
32

JERGEN PAULI JENSEN, REPORT ON

TED CONOVER, HOLDING THE KEY; MY YEAR AS A GUARD AT SING SING 139 (2001); Stuart

Grassian,
Overview:
Summary
of
Substantive
Findings
20
(1999),
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/usa 003/GrassianReport Eng-SiteVisitOne.pdf (describing
this trend at Attica); TERRY A. KuPERS, PRISON MADNESS: THE MENTAL HEALTH CRISIS BEHIND
BARS AND WHAT WE MUST Do ABOUT IT 5 (1999).
33 JACKSON, supra note 30, at 30.
34 TOCH, supra note 30, at 1 et seq.
35 Id. at 383.
36
In re Medley, 134 U.S. 160, 168 (1890) (describing the effects of solitary confinement).
37

Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 237-38 (1940).
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cinations in multiple sensory modalities, including the visual, auditory, tactile,
and olfactory"; "dissociative features including sudden recovery 'as from a
dream,' with subsequent amnesia for the events of the psychosis"; "agitation
and 'motor excitement' with aimless violence"; and "delusions as sudden, and
in some reports, as precipitating at night., 38 In more than half of the substantial
body of literature on prison conditions from the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, solitary confinement was cited as "responsible for precipitating
was often noted when the prisoner's solitary conpsychosis, and rapid recovery
39
terminated.,
was
finement
More recently, a study of inmates at the Massachusetts Correctional Institution at Walpole yielded similar observations. Prisoners in solitary confinement there were "hyperresponsive to external stimuli"; prone to "perceptual
distortions, hallucinations and derealization experiences"; experienced profound
affective disturbances including "massive free-floating anxiety" accompanied
by "recurrent acute episodes of panic and dread of impending death; suffered
from "primitive, ego-dystonic fantasies" involving revenge, torture, and mutila0
tion of prison guards; and experienced a profound lack of impulse control.4
A number of studies have documented the severe mental effects experienced by inmates placed in solitary confinement. For example, in the early
1990s, psychologist Craig Haney assessed the mental health of 100 inmates in
California's Pelican Bay SHU. 41 The inmates were randomly selected and were
assessed in two different face-to-face interviews. Considerable, severe, and
highly prevalent effects of solitary confinement were found among those interviewed: ninety-one percent suffered from anxiety and nervousness; seventy percent "felt themselves on the verge of an emotional breakdown"; seventy-seven
chronic depression; sixty-six percent suffered from a
percent were in a state of
42
patchwork of symptoms.
International studies confirm these trends. In a study of male patients in
a psychiatric clinic in Zurich, approximately sixty-seven of whom were committed directly from solitary confinement, most were experiencing hospitalization
resulting from mental illness for the first time. These prisoners were, unlike
their non-solitary confinement prisoner counterparts, repeatedly hospitalized for
psychiatric reasons, even though they had spent less overall time in solitary confinement (an average of eighty-six days) than their counterparts (an average of
173 days).43 In a follow-up to this study, thirty inmates in solitary confinement
38

PAUL NITscHE & KARL WILLMANNS, THE HISTORY OF THE PRISON PSYCHOSES IN GERMANY

(1912).
40

Grassian, PsychopathologicalEffects, supra note 6, at 1451.
Id. at 1451-54.

41

Craig Haney, Mental Health Issues in Long-Term Solitary and "Supermax" Confinement,

39

49 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 124, 124 (2003).
42
Id. at 132-34.
43

Reto Volkart et al., Einzelhaft als Risikofaktor fur psychiatrische Hospitalisierung, 16

PSYCHIATRICA CLINICA 365, 373-74 (1983).
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were compared to a control group of twenty-eight inmates housed in regular
cells. Isolated inmates had spent an average of ninety-one days in solitary confinement, whereas the control group had spent 326 days in prison. All participants had normal intelligence, but the group of isolated inmates "showed congroup ... [and
siderably more psychopathological symptoms than the control
44
these] effects were mainly caused by solitary confinement."
A Danish study involving 367 pretrial detainees reported a higher rate
of psychiatric problems among isolated inmates than among a control group of
non-isolated inmates. A higher incidence of psychiatric morbidity-mainly
adjustment disorders-was found among those in solitary confinement (twentyeight percent) than among those not in isolation (fifteen percent). The rate of
psychiatric morbidity was highest (forty-three percent) among prisoners who
had been in long-term solitary confinement exceeding two months. 45 The second part of this study revealed even more disturbing findings. In assessing hospitalization rates among remand prisoners, researchers determined that if "a
person remained in [solitary confinement] for 4 weeks the probability of being
admitted to the prison hospital for a psychiatric reason was about twenty times
as high as for a person remanded in [non-solitary confinement] for the same
period of time." 46
These symptoms are more or less in line with psychological observations of individuals who have lived under isolated and restricted conditions beyond the context of solitary confinement in prisons. In particular, reductions in
the nature and variety of activity and stimulations available in one's surrounding
environment and social deprivation have been demonstrated to lead to "acute
disturbances of the normal personality." 47 A more recent review has summarized several decades of research on people who were confined physically
(through restrictions in their movements and activities) and socially (through
physical isolation from the larger population). This review concluded that
"[r]eports of an inability to concentrate or maintain focus are common" and that
"isolation produces significant and often dramatic increases in suggestibility and
hypnotizability" and attentional shifts of the type associated with hallucinations.4 8 Researchers also reported increased levels of psychological problems,
Reto Volkart et al., Eine kontrollierte Untersuchung uber psychopathologische Effekte der
Einzelhaft, 42 ScHwEIZERiscHE ZErrSCHRIFT FUR PSYCHOLOGIE UND IHRE ANWENDUNGEN 25, 44
(1983).
45
Henrik Steen Andersen, Mental Health in Prison Populations: A Review-with Special
Emphasis on a Study of Danish Prisoners on Remand, 10 ACrA PSYCHIATRICA SCANDINAVICA
44

SUPPLEMENTUM 5, 39 (2004).
46
Dorte Maria Sestof et al., Impact of Solitary Confinement on HospitalizationAmong Danish

Prisonersin Custody, 21 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 99, 103 (1998).
47
Raymond H. Thoenig, Solitary Confinement-Punishment Within the Letter of Law, or
Psychological Torture?, 1972 Wis. L. REv. 223, 232 (1972) (citing E.K. Eric Gunderson, EmotionalSymptoms in Extremely Isolated Groups, 9 ARCH. GEN. PSYCH. 362, 363 (1963)).
48
Albert A. Harrison et al., The Human Experience in Antarctica: Applications to Life in
Space, 34 BEHAv. Sci. 253, 257 (1989).
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including sleep disturbances, impaired cognition, anxiety, hostility, minor forms
of psychopathology, heightened frictions and social conflict among members of
the confined group, and potential long-term animosities that could result in deterioration of interpersonal and family relationships. 49
Studies confirm that psychological screening and training are requisite
to prepare individuals, such as those working for the military, for assignments in
isolated and confined environments. These precautions help to minimize the
negative effects of the environment on those who will live there. Some studies
have gone so far as to suggest that some individuals better adapt to physical or
social confinement based upon their basic sense of purpose, 0 a conclusion
which-if true-has profound implications for those whose segregation necessarily carries a pejorative or negative meaning.
For mental patients specifically, professionals are divided over whether
segregation should be permitted at all even beyond the prison system. Although
segregation has proven therapeutic for some patients, there is an acute awareness of the "potential dangers" of seclusion that have resulted in mental health
standards governing the manner and conditions under which such practices
should be employed. 51 Overall, "although it appears to be reasonably wellestablished that seclusion and restraint 'work,' i.e., they provide an effective
means for preventing injury and reducing agitation, it is at least equally wellestablished that these procedures can have serious deleterious physical and
(more often) psychological effects on patients. 52
There is no consensus on the question of duration with respect to postisolation effects, however, and studies suggesting that post-isolation effects are
chronic and severe are equally numerous.5 3 Although symptoms of mental deterioration can appear in otherwise healthy individuals after only a few days in
isolation, some studies indicate that individuals recover quickly when solitary
confinement is terminated.-4 The majority of studies note, however, that many
post-isolation inmates have trouble engaging in social behavior and fear emoId. at 258 (noting that such environments are clearly "stressful" and that a "recurrent concern is that the stresses of isolation and confinement lead to poor mental health and negative
moods").
50
E.K. Eric Funderson, Mental Health Problems in Antarctica, 17 ARCH. ENVTL. HEALTH 558,
49

564 (1988).
51 Tom Mason, Seclusion Theory Reviewed-A Benevolent or Malevolent Intervention?, 33
MED. Sci. LAW 95 (1993); see also Ellen Heyman, Seclusion, 25 J. PSYCHOSOC. NURSING AND
MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES 8, 8-12, 35, 37 (1987); Stanley M. Soliday, A Comparison of Patient
and Staff Attitudes Toward Seclusion, 173 J. OF NERVOUS AND MENTAL DISEASE 292 (1985).
52
William A. Fisher, Restraint and Seclusion: A Review of the Literature, 151 AM. J.

PSYCHOL. 1584, 1588 (1994).
53

See, e.g., JOANE MARTEL, SOLITUDE AND COLD STORAGE: WOMEN'S JOURNEYS OF

ENDURANCE IN SEGREGATION (1999).
54
See, e.g., Grassian, Psychopathological Effects, supra note 6, at 1453; TERRY KuPERS,
PRISON MADNESS (1999).
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tional contact, 55 and for some persons, supermax creates "psychological
pres5 6
sures that... uniquely disable prisoners for freeworld reintegration.
IV. THE COURTS AND SOLITARY CONFINEMENT
Federal courts have given credence to the psychological literature, increasingly recognizing that solitary confinement in particular can seriously injure prisoners. For example, in Davenport v. DeRobertis,57 the Seventh Circuit
noted that "the record shows, what anyway seems pretty obvious, that isolating
a human being from other human beings year after year or even month after
month can cause substantial psychological damage, even if the isolation is not
total., 58 In both Miller ex rel. Jones v. Stewart5 9 and Comer v. Stewart,6° the
Ninth Circuit noted the profound deleterious effects supermax prison conditions
can exert on inmates' mental health. 61 In LaReau v. MacDougall,62 the Second
Circuit refused to condone sensory deprivation in solitary confinement because
of its adverse effects on inmates' psychological well-being. 63 Numerous district
courts have evinced the 64same or similar concerns about the effects of solitary
confinement on inmates.
55

LONA RHODES, TOTAL CONFINEMENT: MADNESS AND REASON IN THE MAXIMUM SECURrrY

PRISON 34 (2004).
56
Craig Haney, The Psychological Impact of Incarceration: Implications for Post-prison
Adjustment 14 (Dec. 2001), http://www.aspe.hhs.gov/hsp/prison2homeO2/haney.pdf.
57
844 F.2d 1310 (7th Cir. 1988).
58
59
60
61

Id. at 1313.
231 F.3d 1248 (9th Cir. 2000), vacated, 531 U.S. 986 (2000).
215 F.3d 910 (9th Cir. 2000).
Miller, 231 F.3d at 1252 ("it is well accepted that conditions such as those present in the

[supermax facility] ... can cause psychological decompensation to the point that individuals may
become incompetent."); Comer, 215 F.3d at 916 ("we and other courts have recognized that prison conditions remarkably similar [to this supermax facility] can adversely affect a person's mental
health.").
62
473 F.2d 974 (2d Cir. 1972).
63
Id. at 978 ("We cannot approve of threatening an inmate's sanity and severing his contacts
with reality by placing him a dark cell almost continuously day and night.").
64
See, e.g., Kane v. Winn, 319 F. Supp. 2d 162, 205 (D. Mass. 2004) (citing a study for the
proposition that solitary confinement commonly leads to pervasive psychological problems among
inmates); Lee v. Coughlin, 26 F. Supp. 2d 615, 637 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) ("[t]he effect of prolonged
isolation on inmates has been repeatedly confirmed in medical and scientific studies"); McClary v.
Kelly, 4 F. Supp. 2d 195, 208 (W.D.N.Y. 1998) ("[the notion that] prolonged isolation from social
and environmental stimulation increases the risk of developing mental illness does not strike this
Court as rocket science"); Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146, 1235 (N.D. Cal. 1995) ("many, if
not most, inmates in [solitary confinement] experience some degree of psychological trauma in
reaction to their extreme social isolation and the severely restricted environmental stimulation");
Bono v. Saxbe, 450 F. Supp. 934, 946 (E.D. Ill. 1978) ("[p]laintiffs' uncontroverted evidence
showed the debilitating mental effect on those inmates confined to the control unit"), aff'd in part
and remanded in part on other grounds, 620 F.2d 609 (7th Cir. 1980).
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Despite their ready acknowledgement of the potential negative effects
of prison conditions, courts have been loathe to hold that solitary confinement
violates the Eighth Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment.
In fact, only one court has gone so far. In Ruiz v. Johnson,6 5 the Southern District of Texas held that conditions in some of Texas' administrative segregation
units were presumptively unconstitutional:
Before the court are levels of psychological deprivation that violate the United States Constitution's prohibition against cruel
and unusual punishment. It has been shown that defendants are
deliberately indifferent to a systemic pattern of extreme social
isolation and reduced environmental stimulation. These deprivations are the cause of cruel and unusual pain and suffering by
inmates in administrative segregation, particularly in Levels II
and 11. 66
More commonly courts have held that while conditions in solitary confinement may "press the outer bounds of what most humans can psychologically
tolerate," the fact remains that it is unclear whether "there is a sufficiently high
risk to all inmates of incurring serious mental illness from exposure to conditions [in solitary confinement] to find that the conditions constitute a per se deprivation of a basic necessity of life. 67
Even if some courts have found that solitary confinement does not reach
the level of cruel and unusual punishment, this does not negate its adverse impact on inmates' psychological well-being. Yet this adverse impact has been
largely overlooked by judicial decision-makers, with only one appellate court
ever having asked whether prison conditions might adversely affect an inmate's
mental health to such an extent that it might impair his ability to exercise (or
waive) constitutional rights. That court-the Ninth Circuit-has twice remanded cases to the district courts for evidentiary hearings on inmates' competency, with special instructions to ascertain whether prison conditions
rendered
68
inmates incompetent to waive appeals of denial of habeas relief.
Other courts have avoided assessing an inmate's competency after the
trial phase because competency is viewed as static; that is, if an inmate is competent to stand trial in the first instance, courts generally assume his competency
65

37 F. Supp. 2d 855 (S.D. Tex. 1999), rev'd on other grounds, 243 F.3d 941 (5th Cir. 2001),

adheredto on remand, 154 F. Supp. 2d 975 (S.D. Tex 2001).
66
Id. at 914-15.
67
68

See Madrid,889 F. Supp. at 1267.
See Miller ex rel. Jones v. Stewart, 231 F.3d 1248, 1248 (9th Cir. 2000), vacated, 531 U.S.

986 (2000) (next friend motion and motion to stay execution of a prisoner who declined to seek
federal habeas relief and refused to be represented by such attorney in doing so); see also Comer
v. Stewart, 215 F.3d 910 (9th Cir. 2000), remanded to 230 F. Supp. 2d 1016 (D. Ariz. 2002) (motion to dismiss appeal of denial of federal habeas relief).
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throughout that and later proceedings. However, this conception is flawed. The
psychological literature makes clear that an inmate's level of competency varies
depending upon the conditions of incarceration. Thus, determining that an inmate is competent at trial will not establish that he is competent at subsequent
judicial proceedings, and will especially not establish whether he is competent
to proceed pro se. Rather, post-conviction environmental factors within a prison
can exacerbate pre-existing propensities toward mental illness among at-risk
prison populations and can undermine the mental health of even those individuals without any pre-existing propensities toward developing mental health conditions. As a result, the competency of inmates subjected to solitary confinement must be reevaluated at the point at which they seek to exercise their Sixth
Amendment rights of self-representation if the integrity of the tribunal is to be
preserved.
V. THE CASE FOR RE-EVALUATING INMATES
Though currently not standard practice, re-evaluation of an inmate's
competency is consistent with the Supreme Court's elaboration of the right of
self-representation extended to criminal defendants by the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments. In Faretta v. California,the Court made it clear that the exercise
of the right of self-representation is not an absolute right, but may be overridden
to prevent "serious obstructionist misconduct." 69 The Court also described selfrepresentation as subject to the protection of "the dignity of the courtroom" and
compliance with "procedural and substantive law."' 70 Then, in McKaskle v.
Wiggins, the Court rejected a defendant's objection to the role that standby
counsel had played, and in so doing observed that "the defendant's right to proceed pro se exists in the larger context of the criminal trial designed to determine whether or not a defendant is guilty of the offense with which he is
charged.",7 ' Finally, in Martinez v. Court of Appeal of California,the Supreme
Court declined to extend the right to self-representation to appeals of criminal
convictions, noting that "[e]ven at the trial level... the government's interest in
ensuring the integrity and efficiency of the72trial at times outweighs the defendant's interest in acting as his own lawyer.,
Additionally, the Supreme Court has long recognized the overwhelming
public interest in preventing mental incapacities from undermining the reliability of the adversarial process. 73 This interest has also served to justify limits on
69
70

422 U.S. 806, 834 n.46 (1975).
Id. at 834.

71
72

465 U.S. 168, 177 n.8 (1984).
528 U.S. 152, 162 (2000).

73
See Lankford v. Idaho, 500 U.S. 110, 126-27 (1991) (adversary process critical for ultimate
objective of avoiding error); Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 379-80 (1986); United
States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 655-56 (1984); Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 862 (1975) (a
properly functioning adversary process serves "the ultimate objective that the guilty be convicted
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the admissibility of evidence, in order to prevent "confusion of the issues. 74 In
the context of the right to counsel of choice, a defendant's decision "may be
limited by the need for a fair trial. 75 This independent public interest is reflected in Faretta, where common legal experience indicates that selfrepresentation diminishes adversarial testing of the prosecution's case and frequently harms the defendant himself.
To the extent that mental illness impedes a defendant's ability to represent himself or to competently waive otherwise guaranteed rights, it necessarily
poses a genuine threat to the vital public interest in reliable adjudication of contested criminal charges because the law governing competency to stand trial
rests on this basis. In Dusky v. United States, the Court indicated that a defendant must have "sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding" and "a rational as well as factual un76
derstanding of the proceedings against him" in order to be fit to stand trial.
The Court later summarized this standard: "It has long been accepted that a person whose mental conditions is such that he lacks the capacity to understand the
nature and object of the proceedings against him, to consult with counsel, and to
assist in preparing his defense may not be subjected to a trial. 77
Then, in Riggins v. Nevada, Justice Kennedy agreed that "the State has
a legitimate interest in attempting to restore the competency of otherwise incompetent defendants," sufficient to override an autonomy interest in refusing
medication.78 Justice Kennedy added that due process would not even permit a
State generally to recognize a defendant's competent waiver of the right to be
competent at trial. 79 Beyond the trial court, any decision to waive federally
guaranteed rights requires that the court be convinced that the waiver decision
was made intelligently and intentionally. 80 This has been extended to postconviction remedies where waiver of rights will result in the execution of the
defendant. Waivers of constitutional rights, like petitioning for a writ of habeas
corpus, in particular, are disfavored, and courts must indulge in every reasonable presumption against them.8'
This body of law reflects the overriding importance of the public interest in reliable adversarial testing of contested charges. Even the constitutional
and the innocent go free"); Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657, 671 (1957) ("the Government
which prosecutes an accused also has the duty to see that justice is done").
74
Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 326 (2006).
75
United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 148 n.3 (2006).
76
362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960).
77
Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171 (1975).
78
504 U.S. 127, 139 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
79

Id. at 140.

Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 467-68 (1938) (Sixth Amendment rights of defendant
violated where he was denied counsel in federal court).
81
Id. at 464.
80
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requirement is commonly stated in terms that flatly bar a defendant from standing trial who does not meet the standards for competence to stand trial.8 2 Congress adopted this standard by requiring that a trial court "order" a competency
hearing, even sua sponte, "if there is reasonable cause to believe that the defendant may presently be suffering from a mental disease or defect rendering him
mentally incompetent to the extent that he is unable to understand the nature and
consequences of the proceedings against him or to assist properly in his defense., 83 The committee report developed during the passage of this statutory
provision explains that "it is mandatory that the court order a hearing" on competency if there is reasonable cause to believe that the defendant is lacking mental competence. 84 Given the potentially devastating effects of solitary confinement on inmates, such reasonable cause should be deemed to exist in all cases
where inmates have been isolated.

VI.

A MODEL FOR COURTS: WHEN TO ORDER COMPETENCY
DETERMINATIONS

The Ninth Circuit has provided other courts with a straightforward
model for assessing an inmate's competency should he seek to waive constitutional rights. In Comer v. Stewart85 the court recognized that conditions on
death row whereby inmates were effectively held in solitary confinement could
have caused otherwise competent inmates to become incompetent and thus render them unable to waive their constitutional rights.8 6 In so doing, the Ninth
Circuit relied upon the competency standard as set forth in Rees v. Peyton,87
which defined competency as "whether [the defendant] has capacity to appreciate his position and make a rational choice with respect to continuing or abandoning further litigation or on the other hand whether he is suffering from a
mental disease,88disorder, or defect which may substantially affect his capacity in
the premises."
Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 396 (1993) ("A criminal defendant may not be tried unless
he is competent.") (citation omitted); accord Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 448 (1992) ("If
a defendant is incompetent, due process considerations require suspension of the criminal trial
until such time, if any, that the defendant regains the capacity to participate in his defense and
understand the proceedings against him.").
83
18 U.S.C. § 424 1(a) (2006).
84
S. REP. No. 98-225, at 234 (1983), reprintedin 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182.
85
215 F.3d 910 (9th Cir. 2000), remanded to 230 F. Supp. 2d 1016 (D. Ariz. 2002) (motion to
82

dismiss appeal of denial of federal habeas relief).
86
See Miller ex rel. Jones v. Stewart, 231 F.3d 1248, 1252 (9th Cir. 2000), vacated, 531 U.S.
986 (2000) (granting stay and remanding for fact-finding on inmate's competency, because prison
conditions might have caused "psychological decomposition" to the point where inmate became
incompetent); see also Comer, 215 F.3d at 916 (remanding for fact-finding on inmate's competency, because prison conditions led inmate to display "delusional and bizarre behavior").
87
384 U.S. 312 (1966).
88
Id. at 314.
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The district court's interpretation of the Ninth Circuit's instructions in
Comer to assess the impact of prison conditions on inmates' competency technically differs from the actual instructions handed to the district court by the Ninth
Circuit, which asked the district court to assess only whether prison conditions
could have caused Mr. Comer to become impaired such that he should be
deemed unable to waive his constitutional rights. The district court in Comer
actually understood the Ninth Circuit to be directing it to undertake two separate
(but related) inquiries: (1) whether Mr. Comer was competent to waive further
appeals; and (2) whether that decision was rendered involuntary by the conditions of his incarceration.89 In other words, although the Ninth Circuit never
explicitly directed the district court to consider voluntariness, the district court
nevertheless segregated prison conditions qua voluntariness from the mental
competency determination itself.90
Had the district court applied the Ninth Circuit's test literally, it might
have relied upon the mental health profession to undertake a less-traditional
analysis of the inmate's competency, by comparing a post-solitary competency
determination with a previous determination of the inmate's mental health. Although it departs from the instruction of the Ninth Circuit, the district court's
model has the virtue of obviating a judicial inquiry into the appropriateness or
effectiveness of current psychological models used to evaluate competency by
bifurcating the prison conditions inquiry from the psychological test itself.9 In
so doing, the district court relied upon two cases in which other federal courts
have held that conditions of confinement can render a waiver of rights involuntary: 9Groseclose
ex rel. Harries v. Dutton92 and Smith ex rel. Smith v. Armon3
trout.

In both of these cases, the conditions of confinement were substantially
similar. In Groseclose, the defendant was housed in a six-by-eight foot cell,
containing a toilet with wash basin and a bunk bed occupying approximately
89

In Comer,

[tihe district court found that inmates spent 24 hours a day in windowless cells
that were five to six feet wide and eight to ten feet long. Cells were cold,
moist, and reeked of human excrement "caused by the bodily functions of inmates, eating, sleeping and eliminating under crowded conditions in the same
immediate area." The court also noted the "unrelenting nerve-racking din that
fills the segregation units," which caused "a profound impact on lockup inmates, some of whom consider it to be the single worst aspect of their confinement." Vermin, including cockroaches, mice, and rats "that thrive[d] upon
the accumulated filth" infested the unit.
215 F.3d 910, 916 n.4 (9th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted).
90
See id. at 918 (noting that the Ninth Circuit directed this Court to assess "whether Mr. Corner's particular conditions of confinement have rendered his decision to withdrawal his appeal
involuntary").
91
See Comer v. Stewart, 230 F. Supp. 2d 1016, 1028 (D. Ariz. 2000).
92
594 F. Supp. 949, 952 (W.D. Tenn. 1984) (waiver of federal and state review).
93
632 F. Supp. 503 (W.D. Mo. 1986) (waiver of post-conviction remedies).

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2009

15

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 111, Iss. 3 [2009], Art. 10
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. I111

one-third of the cell. The cell was illuminated by one sixty-watt light bulb. He
had no window and the ventilation was so limited that cigarette smoke stained
his cell walls, toilet odors made it difficult for him to sleep, and the prison's use
of oil-based paints caused him to suffer respiratory problems. The defendant
was confined in his cell for twenty-three hours per day, and the temperature in
the cell frequently reached "life threatening limits." 94 By contrast, in Armontrout, the defendant's cell was eight-by-nine feet. The cell had no ventilation
and sewage backups frequently caused flooding. There were infestations of rats,
roaches, and other pests. Inmates were allowed, at most, a forty-five minute
exercise period six times per week, and were granted access to three showers.
As in Groseclose, each cell was lit by a single low-wattage bulb suspended thirteen feet from the ground.95
As with the district courts in Groseclose and Armontrout, the district
court did not consider whether Mr. Comer's conditions of confinement rendered
him per se mentally incompetent. Rather, it was able to impute prison conditions into the competency determination by analyzing whether the conditions of
confinement were so inhumane that they negated any will he might otherwise
have had to continue living, and whether this could have served as the motivating factor in his decision to waive further post-conviction review. 96 This model
provides a judicially manageable standard for assessing whether prison conditions might render an inmate's waiver of constitutional rights improper because
it does not require a re-evaluation of psychological models used to test mental
competence. It requires only a consideration of whether an inmate's decision to
waive key rights was made under duress sufficient to render the waiver invalid
in cases where inmates were subjected to solitary confinement. Given the astounding and similar facts in cases adjudicated under this model, these three
cases provide a sound basis for patterning future determinations of the voluntariness of waivers.
VII. CONCLUSION

Solitary confinement, particularly at supermax facilities, poses an acute
threat to the mental health of inmates. The impact of isolation, even beyond the
penal context, has been shown to adversely affect even the healthiest of individuals. When translated into the prison context, however, its impact is even
more pronounced. The precise degree to which it undermines inmates' competency is not yet fully understood; however, it is clear that solitary confinement
has deleterious effects that may persist even beyond the period of confinement.
More troubling, some inmates may superficially appear rational even though
Groseclose, 594 F. Supp. at 959.
95
Armontrout, 632 F. Supp. at 512 n.24.
96
Cf Comer, 230 F. Supp. 2d at 1034 (assessing Mr. Comer's mental competency, prison
conditions notwithstanding); but see id. at 1028 et seq. (assessing the impact of prison conditions
on the voluntariness of Mr. Comer's decision).
94
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they lack the requisite competency to fully appreciate their actions. They may
thus fail to reach the threshold of competency needed to waive constitutional
rights. For these inmates, a new conception of the role of competency determinations would help to ensure that only those inmates who are actually competent
to waive constitutional rights are permitted by the courts to do so. The Ninth
Circuit set an important precedent in Comer v. Stewart by recognizing that
prison conditions do play a deleterious role in some inmates' mental health by
directing the district court to impute prison conditions into competency determinations. Given the severe impact that solitary confinement may have on the
mental condition of inmates, other courts should follow suit and reconsider the
competency of inmates when they seek to waive fundamental rights during the
adjudicatory process, even if they had been deemed competent at the start of the
trial proceedings.
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